
- Mac os 10.0 torrent for mac#
- Mac os 10.0 torrent registration#
- Mac os 10.0 torrent software#
- Mac os 10.0 torrent download#
- Mac os 10.0 torrent torrent#
To find the time, we look for when the BitTorrent handshake begins.
Mac os 10.0 torrent torrent#
We can use this information to find out if in fact the activity was malicious, or just a user forgetting to turn off a torrent on their laptop when coming into the office. The next information the exercise wants us to find is the start time of the torrent activity, the file that was downloaded, the name of the torrent client used, and the file that was seeded (shared) by the client. Looking at packet 1826 and expanding HTTP we see that the User-Agent field contains “Windows NT 10.0”: We can find HTTP packets that contain User-Agent with the filter ip.addr = 10.0.0.201 & er_agent. We can actually find this from any HTTP traffic in the capture, since HTTP includes a field called User-Agent in its header. Diving down into Kerberos –> as-req –> req-body –> cname –> cname-string in packet 1596 we see that the CNameString value is elmer.blanco, our user. Here’s the capture filtered to show only Kerberos traffic with the filter ip.addr = 10.0.0.201 & kerberos.CNameString and !(kerberos.CNameString contains $) (we specifically filter out CNameString values with $ so that we don’t get extraneous sources like shared drives, etc). The Kerberos protocol presents the authenticating username in a field called cname, specifically in the CNameString. If we assume that we’re in an organization using some sort of authentication system for users, we should see a network authentication protocol like Kerberos. We have to dig pretty deep to find the Windows username.

There happens to also be mdns traffic in this capture, which we could use to find the host name.
Mac os 10.0 torrent registration#
The info column shows that the first packet is a registration message for the host BLANCO-DESKTOP, but you can see it in the packet decode in packet 34 under NetBIOS Name Service –> Queries: We can pull out the nbns traffic with the filter nbns&ip.addr=10.0.0.201. Since we know it’s a Windows machine, we can probably count on the nbns (NetBIOS Name Service) protocol to be there, which Windows uses to advertise hosts that make themselves available on the network. In the Ethernet II field we see the Src: equal to 00:16:17:18:66:c8.
Mac os 10.0 torrent for mac#
For MAC address, we filter out only that traffic that originates from the source IP with the filter ip.src=10.0.0.201. Most of these can be found with some pretty simple CloudShark filters and packet analysis. This not only helps us identify the offending machine, but also the user logged in while downloading files via BitTorrent. For this, Brad asks us to find the MAC address, host name, Windows user account name, and Windows version. First off all is identifying the user and host that is using BitTorrent. The exercise wants us to find several details.
Mac os 10.0 torrent download#
Since BitTorrent is a distributed Peer-to-Peer (P2P) download platform, traffic between each node involved in the transfer gets marked as a threat! When looking at this in CloudShark Threat Assessment, we see over one hundred threat alerts (!) all going to the same target address, in this case, 10.0.0.201, which is seeding the BitTorrent and sharing the file with other peers. The Suricata threat rules will flag BitTorrent traffic by default. Domain controller: 10.0.0.2 (DogOfTheYear-DC).Malware-traffic-analysis also gives us the following details about the network environment:

We’re told the IP address of the offender ( 10.0.0.201), though it doesn’t take too much work to find it. It might be that we’ve received these alerts from an independent regulatory body like the RIAA, or it may be that our Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is flagging the traffic because of some threat rules.Īs part of the exercise, we’re given this packet capture. The scenario we’re given is that we’re receiving alerts that someone on our network is using the BitTorrent protocol to download files. This exercise is from July 2018, shortly after Sharkfest that year.
Mac os 10.0 torrent software#
This exercise is great if you’re in IT or network security and are tasked with finding out who is using peer-to-peer software in your organization, and whether or not they should be! The Exercise - So someone’s BitTorrenting on your network You can see the retrospective of Sharkfest US 2018 here. Sharkfest is an international meeting of packet enthusiasts run by the folks behind Wireshark.

This time however, we’re going through one armed with tools that we learned from Brad’s class (the author of malware-traffic-analysis) at Sharkfest US 2018, where he gave an in-depth class on using packet captures for malware analysis, as well as a presentation on Analyzing Windows malware traffic. We love the exercises at, and occasionally we’ll pick some that we try to solve using CloudShark and its tools. Tracking down BitTorrent activity with packet captures
